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讲座|1024|郑捷:Air Pollution, Adverse Selection and Health Insurance Purchase 发布时间: 2019-10-19   浏览次数: 29

讲座|1024|郑捷:Air Pollution, Adverse Selection and Health Insurance Purchase


    Air Pollution, Adverse Selection and Health Insurance Purchase

主讲人郑捷

    20191024日(周四)上10:30-12:00

    :位育楼117

主讲人简介

郑捷,清华大学经济管理学院经济系副教授。教育经历:清华大学(1999-2005)和美国华盛顿大学(2005-2011)。研究领域:经济理论、信息经济学、实验经济学、行为经济学等。当前主要研究方向:理性泡沫、自我控制、社会型偏好、参照依赖、交通系统优化以及在信息设计、实验设计、机制设计等。学术职位:清华大学经济管理学院经济科学与政策实验室(ESPEL)常务副主任,国际学术期刊Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization副编辑(Associate Editor)Research in Economics副编辑(Associate Editor)Journal of Asian Economics执行编辑(Executive Editor)

Air Pollution, Adverse Selection and Health Insurance Purchase

Abstract: Recent literature has focused on the effect of air pollution on financial decisions, including health insurance purchase. Using detailed individual level data on health insurance for serious illnesses combined with individual serious illness and mortality data, we find that AQI increases health insurance purchase, but the effect is not merely psychological. Those who purchased insurance during high AQI days indeed had higher serious illness and mortality rates subsequently. In addition, we exploit the policy change of AQI information availability and find that the availability of this information drives the effect. In other words, an interaction between momentary air quality perception and true adverse selection is behind the positive effect of air pollution on health insurance take-up. Furthermore, our results show that the effect is not only on the insurance purchase decision domain, but on the expenditure level of the insurance plan. We run a robustness check at level of cities, and find that results can be deceiving in the aggregate. The effect of AQI on insurance take-up at the city level is not necessarily positive. The result highlights the importance of using individual level insurance purchase and medical data in drawing conclusions about the effect of AQI on insurance demand.

摘要:最近的研究关注空气污染对金融决定,包括健康保险的购买。使用详细的个人的保险购买的数据,我们发现AQI增加了健康保险的购买,但是这个影响不单单是心理上的。购买健康险的人,有更大概率患严重的病和死亡。我们还利用关于AQI这个信息的政策的变化,发现了信息的可得性和真实的逆向选择是主要的机制。进一步,我们发现不单单是购买决定的影响,对于购买金额也有影响。我们还利用了城市级别的数据,发现加总的数据并不能产生一样的结果,这突出了使用个人级别的数据的重要性。

Keywords: health insurance, air pollution, adverse selection, attention, information

 


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